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Abstract
In this study, I investigate the effects of skill premium, and gender wage gap on female
labor force participation in Turkey. I examine in particular the answers to two questions,
namely, how females’ labor participation decisions would change if there were no gender
wage gap and how it would be in the absence of female skill premium. I build a general
equilibrium model populated by married households. Households differ by educational at-
tainment levels of their members and they decide the labor supply of members and savings.
I select parameter values so that the benchmark economy resembles features of the Turkish
economy in 2006 in terms of gender wage gap, skill premium, tax structure, and female labor
force participation across education groups and ages. In this thesis, I find that both changes
in gender wage gap and female skill premium have substantial effects on the female labor
force participation rate. The increase that occurs in female labor force participation after
gender wage gap elimination and female skill premium elimination are 52.7% and 253.5%
respectively. Furthermore, in both alternative economies the increase in female labor force
participation rates have occurred due to a significant increase in the labor force participation
rates of low-skilled females.
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TÜRK˙IYE’DE KADINLARIN ˙IS¸GÜCÜNE KATILIMI: C˙INS˙IYETE DAYALI
ÜCRET FARKLILIKLARI VE VASIF PR˙IM˙IN˙IN ROLÜ
Bas¸ak Canbak
Ekonomi Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2012
Tez Danıs¸manı: Remzi Kaygusuz
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kadınların ˙Is¸gücüne Katılımı; Cinsiyete Dayalı Ücret Farklılıkları;
Vasıf Primi; Türkiye
Özet
Bu tezde, vasıf priminin ve cinsiyete dayalı ücret farklılıklarının Türkiye’deki kadın is¸gücüne
katılımına etkileri analiz edilmektedir. Asıl olarak cinsiyete dayalı ücret farklılıkları ve
vasıf primi olmasaydı kadınların is¸gücüne katılım oranları nasıl deg˘is¸irdi sorularına cevap
verilmeye çalıs¸ılmıs¸tır. Sunulan model, evli hanehalklarından olus¸an genel denge mode-
lidir. Hanehalkları üyelerinin yas¸ ve eg˘itim seviyeleri açısından farklılık gösterip, onların
is¸gücü katılımlarına ve tasarruflarına karar vermektedir. Model, ana model 2006 Türkiye
ekonomisini cinsiyete dayalı ücret farklılıkları, vasıf primi, vergi yapısı ve yas¸lar ve eg˘itim
seviyelerindeki kadın is¸gücü açısından yansıtacak s¸ekilde kalibre edilmis¸tir. Bu tezde cin-
siyete dayalı ücret farklılıklarının ve vasıf priminin kadınların is¸gücüne katılım oranlarında
büyük etkileri oldug˘u bulunmus¸tur. Cinsiyete dayalı ücret farklılıklarının ve vasıf priminin
ortadan kalktıg˘ı durumlarda kadınların is¸gücüne katılım oranları sırasıyla %52.7 ve %253.5
artmıs¸tır. Ayrıca, iki alternatif ekonomide de kadınların is¸gücüne katılım oranlarındaki artıs¸,
düs¸ük vasıflı kadınların is¸gücüne katılımlarındaki önemli artıs¸tan kaynaklanmıs¸tır.
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1 Introduction
Female labor force participation rates have increased considerably in developed countries in
recent years. In contrast, in Turkey it shows a declining trend in the last 30 years from a level
of 48% in the 1980s and today it is remarkably low compared to OECD and EU-19 countries.
Furthermore, there are significant variations in female participation rates in various regions
of the country (World Bank, 2009, 2010).
Available studies indicate that factors such as level of education, number of children,
migration, marital status, socio-cultural factors, and wage levels are determinants of female
labor force participation in Turkey. In recent years, women have become more educated; they
are getting married at a later age; fertility rates are declining, and social attitudes towards
working women are changing. However, despite these factors, the ratio of women who are
seeking jobs in Turkey is still decreasing.
In some studies, it is indicated that the main reason that women do not participate the
labor force is that market wage level is below the reservation wage level, which corresponds
to the total value of home production for women (Kasnakoglu and Dayioglu, 2002). In other
words, the earnings potential for low-skilled women in urban areas might not be high enough
in Turkey to motivate them to leave home for work. The high opportunity cost of home
production–such as high childcare fees and lower wage levels compared to men in the labor
market–for these women may explain the more dominant economic reasons for their low
participation levels. Some of these studies (Kasnakoglu and Dayioglu, 1997) argue that wage
differences among genders keep women out of the labor market. There is a large gap in hourly
wages between low skilled men and women in Turkey although this gap is not observable
for high-skilled workers. Women without university degrees generally have only access to
jobs which offer low wages, require long and hard working hours, and do not provide social
security.
Given the importance and recent emphasis on skill premium and the fact that valuable
skills are mostly acquired through schooling, education remains vital for examining wage
distribution. Although education cannot explain all of the wage gaps between genders, it is
shown that the returns from an extra year of schooling are proportionately higher for women
than for men, particularly at the secondary school level (Duman, 2010). Moreover, there
is evidence to indicate that as the level of education increases, the probability of women
entering the labor market also increases (Kasnakoglu and Dayioglu, 1997) and the effect of
female education on female labor force participation appears to be stronger for developed
provinces compared to less developed ones in Turkey (Tansel and Gungor, 2012).
To my knowledge, this thesis is among the first to discuss the relationship between skill
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premium, gender gap, and female labor force participation in Turkey by using a macroeco-
nomic model. In this study, I investigate the answers to two questions. First, if females earn
the same wages that males earn, how much does the participation rate of females increase?
Secondly, how do female labor force participation rates change if low-skilled females earn
the same wages as high-skilled females? By answering these questions, I analyse how much
wage discrimination against women, and female skill premium affect female’s labor force
participation decisions.
In order to investigate the impacts of skill premium and gender wage gap on female labor
force participation, I construct a general equilibrium model populated by finitely lived, mar-
ried households. In the model, agents differ according to gender and skill levels (education).
In their working stage of life, households make labor, consumption and savings decisions
of their members. Husbands who are not retired always work, but wives can choose not to
work. Also, if both the husband and wife participate in the labor market, the household incurs
a fixed utility cost, and there is no uncertainty about a worker’s future productivity. Besides
income, consumption and capital taxes, working people pay social security taxes. Addition-
ally, individuals retire after the mandatory retirement age and their income consists of private
savings and social security benefits, which are functions of their past labor earnings. The
calibrated model economy resembles features of the Turkish economy in 2006 so that the
model economy is consistent with observations in terms of gender wage gap, skill premium,
income tax structure, and female labor force participation across education groups and ages.
In this study, I find that both gender wage gap and skill premium have significant effects
on the labor force participation of married women. When gender wage gap is eliminated,
female labor force participation increases by 52.7%. Furthermore, skill premium elimina-
tion also increases female labor force participation and the increase in the second alternative
economy is bigger than the increase in the first one. Finally, in both economies the increase
occurs mostly because of the increase in the labor force participation of low-skilled females.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the related literature.
Section 3 reports some trends in the female labor force participation, wages, distribution of
individuals by educational attainment in Turkey in 2006. Section 4 describes the model while
Section 5 details the calibration process. In Section 6, I present the results of the benchmark
economy and alternative economies and do a comparison. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature Review
This thesis is related to the literature that examines the relationship of female labor force
participation, wages and educational attainment. Ince and Demir (2006) investigate how the
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determinants of adult female literacy rate; the ratio of graduated women from primary, sec-
ondary, tertiary and higher education; fertility rate, and female unemployment rate affect
female labor force participation in a period from 1980 to 2004 in Turkey. Econometric es-
timates show that there is a negative impact of unemployment and literacy while there is a
positive impact of fertility and higher education on female labor force participation. They
find that when the education level of females increases, they start to get more share in the
labor force; hence, increasing school enrollment has a positive effect on the labor force par-
ticipation of females.
Time series is another way to examine aspects of female labor force participation rates
in Turkey. Tansel (2002) looks at econometric estimates of the determinants of female la-
bor force participation rates across the 67 provinces for the years 1980, 1985 and 1990 in
Turkey. She explains the relationship between female labor force participation and the level
of economic development, concentrating on the U-shaped hypothesis of female labor force
participation. As a result of these studies, she finds that both the rate of economic growth and
level of female education have a strong positive effect on female labor force participation.
Furthermore, in another paper, Tansel (1999) discusses the factors that explain employ-
ment choice and wage differentials between genders in public administration, state-owned
enterprises and formal wage sector in Turkey by using the 1994 Household Expenditure Sur-
vey in the analyses. She finds that the higher the educational level, the higher its contribution
to the participation in a sector. The marginal effects of experience and education are much
larger for men than for women. On the other hand, while the wages of women and men are
at parity in public administration, there is a large gender wage gap in the private sector.
There are also studies that focus on the female labor force participation in the US. At-
tanasio et. al (2007) construct a life-cycle model with endogenous female labor force par-
ticipation, consumption, and saving choices to investigate the increase in the labor supply of
mothers between 1940 and 1950. The dynamics of labor supply depends on child care costs,
returns to experience and the level of female wages. They calibrate the model to match the
behavior of the 1940 cohort and investigate which changes in the main determinants of labor
supply account for the increase in the labor supply of females. They conclude that a decrease
in childcare cost explains the increase in the participation of mothers of young children and
an increase in the level of wages also leads to a substantial increase in the labor supply of
women. Moreover, they find that an increase in the return to experience does not increase the
participation rate of mothers as observed in the data.
Gottschalk and Pizer (1999) explore whether the skill intensity of recent cohorts show
any evidence of the rising skill premium in the US. They analyse ORG and IPUMS data and
look specifically at the college intensity of recent labor market entrants. They find that both
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females and males are likely to have college degrees, but the college intensity is larger for
women than for men. The findings suggest that females go to college in greater numbers than
males because their options in high school jobs are more limited. In other words, while a
male high school graduate may find a good job, the corresponding jobs for females may be
more limited.
In order to investigate the basic forces behind the changes in female labor force participa-
tion and education, Fernandez and Wong (2011) focus on the role of divorce. They develop
a dynamic stochastic life cycle model to evaluate how changes in family structure and eco-
nomic environment between 1935 and 1955 lead to changes in the education choices and
labor force decisions of women. The model is calibrated by using data for the cohort born
in 1935 and they change the characteristics of the environment in order to mimic the 1955
cohort. They show that the increased probability of divorce that is seen in the 1955 cohort
is a key driver of the increase in women’s work, and it significantly reduced the education
gender gap. In terms of welfare, they present that conditional on education level, men greatly
benefited from the changing economic environment, but both high school and college women
incurred welfare losses as a result of these changes. Thus, it is shown that both changes in
family and wage structure have significant effects on labor force participation of married
women and these changes account for a small proportion of the labor force participation gap
for high school women.
Gatti and Dollar (1999) investigate in their paper the relationships among gender inequal-
ity, income and growth, using data for over 100 countries over the past three decades. Their
primary focus is on gender inequality in educational attainment. They find that gender in-
equality in secondary schooling is bad for growth, but only for countries at lower middle
income status and above, and increases in per capita income lead to reductions in gender
inequality.
3 Trends in Female Labor Force Participation
In this part, I report statistics about female labor force participation, wages and educational
attainment of married households in 2006. All statistics that are documented here are com-
posed from TURKSTAT Household Labor Force Statistics, 2006 and TURKSTAT Household
Budget Survey, 2006.
In order to analyze individuals who are in the labor force, I consider people who are 20
to 64 years old. I consider only married individuals to study the labor force behavior of
married women. In the analysis, only full-time workers are included while people who are
self-employed or unpaid workers are excluded.
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I consider the population in three educational categories which are less than or equal to
primary school (ps), secondary school or high school (shs) and greater than or equal to college
(col). The first category consists of people who have degrees that are less than or equal to
a primary school degree; the second category consists of people who have a degree between
secondary school and high school; and, the final category consists of people who have at least
college degree. Thus, based on these categories, there would be nine household types.
Table 1: Classification of Skill Types
Skill Type Educational Attainment
ps <=primary school degree
shs secondary school degree, high school degree
col >=college degree
Table 2 gives an idea about the labor force participation rates of married females and
males. It can be seen that female labor force participation is increasing according to their
education. It increases sharply after high school degree and the highest rates are achieved
at the university level. This indicates the importance of education in increasing labor force
participation of women.1For men, the highest participation rates are at the secondary school-
high school degree and university level. At the university level, participation rates do not
differ much between genders where the rates are highest for both men and women. It is
crucial that there is a huge gap in labor force participation rates between genders at primary
school and secondary school-high school degree.
Table 2: Labor Force Participation Rates by Educational Attainment, 2006 (%)
Educational Attainment Female Male
ps 4.22 52
shs 9.8 70.63
col 47.62 77.89
In this period, the average labor force participation rate of married women is 9.01%.2
1This is also demonstrated by other studies (Tansel 1994 and 2002).
2I consider married females who are 20 to 64 years old. Only full-time workers are included, and married
females who are self-employed or unpaid workers are excluded.
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Table 3 shows the labor force participation rates of married women and men by age groups
in 2006. Female labor force participation rates increase until the ages 35-39, then begin to
decline afterwards. After the ages 40-44, female labor force participation rate declines almost
by half. The early retirement scheme introduced in the early 1980s may be a factor that
contributes to this declining participation rate.3For males, labor force participation rates are
very high compared to females and they begin to decrease after ages 45-49.
In 2006, average working hours per married working men is 0.47 hours per week whereas
the average hours per married working women is 0.41 hours per week.4
Table 3: Labor Force Participation by Age, 2006 (%)
Age Female Male
20-24 6.1 66.55
25-29 11.39 76.4
30-34 13.02 79.34
35-39 14.4 77.9
40-44 11.57 76.47
45-49 7.79 62.29
50-54 4.28 39.08
55-59 1.83 22.5
60-64 1.06 11.82
Table 4 shows age-earning profiles for 2006, constructed by using TURKSTAT House-
hold Budget Survey in 2006. I find average hourly wages for females and males in each
age group. Heckman selection correction procedure is used in order to correct for sample
selection bias, and I impute wages for females who do not work by implementing a Heck-
3According to early retirement scheme introduced in the early 1980s, women after 20 years of service or at
age 50 and men after 25 years of service or at age 55 were eligible for retirement. This is changed and longer
years of service and a higher age limit were introduced in 2001.
4According to TURKSTAT 2006 Household Labor Force Statistics, on average a woman works 46.49 hours,
and a man works 52.76 hours in a week. I assume that 112 hours is the total amount of time available for work
in a week.
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man selection model.5 I calculate monthly working hours by multiplying weekly working
hours with four. Then, in order to find hourly wages of individuals I divide monthly wages
by monthly working hours that I calculated before. I normalize them with the hourly wage
for the entire sample to make the wages comparable. Table 4 gives idea about the gender gap
and skill premium for men and women.
Table 4: Productivity Values by Types, 2006
Males Females
Age ps shs col ps shs col
20-24 0.792 0.960 1.743 0.403 0.810 1.712
25-29 0.903 1.168 2.407 0.522 1.102 2.398
30-34 0.942 1.398 2.845 0.606 1.252 2.850
35-39 1.004 1.544 3.124 0.646 1.350 3.093
40-44 1.106 1.708 3.044 0.650 1.407 3.097
45-49 1.097 1.841 3.465 0.633 1.389 2.881
50-54 0.951 1.699 3.173 0.566 1.319 2.664
55-59 0.752 1.504 3.031 0.491 1.164 2.465
60-64 0.628 1.363 3.465 0.416 1.102 2.133
For almost all education-age cells, wages of married women are lower than the wages
of married men. As education level increases, wages of both genders increase and highest
wages are achieved at college level. Meanwhile, the young and unskilled females experience
the lowest wages.
Next, I find gender gap values according to education by using the data on wages. The
critical fact that could be observed from these gender gap values is that as education of women
increases, gender wage gap decreases.6Moreover, the college premium for women is bigger
than the one for men.
5For the equation for wages, I assume that log wages of women depend on education, age, and age-squared.
For the selection equation, I assume that the probability of participation in the labor market for a female depends
on her marital status, education and age.
6Gender gap is calculated as the ratio of females’ hourly wage and males’ hourly wage.
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In Table 5, the educational composition of married households in 2006 is shown. The
fraction of the married households with both members having at least primary school degree
is the biggest one. However, the proportion of the married households with both members
having at least college degree is one of the lowest fraction.
Table 5: Distribution of Married Households by Educational Attainment, 2006 (%)
Female
Male ps shs col Total:
ps 47.91 3.73 0.1 51.74
shs 20.83 12.3 1.22 34.35
col 3.59 5.58 4.74 13.91
Total: 72.33 21.61 6.06 100
4 The Model
In this part, I describe the general equilibrum life-cycle model populated by heterogeneous
agents in detail.
4.1 Demographics
The economy consists of finitely lived individuals who live at most T periods, and they do
not face any mortality risk during their life time. Each agent enters economic life as married
and there is no divorce over the life. I assume that husband and wife are of the same age.
Households differ by labor market productivity (education) of their members. They begin
life as workers and retire after the mandatory retirement age tR:
4.2 Productive Heterogeneity
Each member of the household is characterized by a given productivity level. x(k; t) denotes
the labor productivity of a female of skill level k and age t, z(i; t) denotes the labor produc-
tivity of a male of skill level i and age t. I assume that z(i; t) and x(k; t) take a finite number
of possible values in the sets Z and X . Each agent is born with a skill type that does not
change over the life. Moreover, there is no uncertainty about a worker’s future productivity.
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4.3 Preferences
In this economy, agents value consumption and dislike labor. At each period, individuals are
endowed with one unit of time that husbands who are not retired always work, but wives can
use this time for leisure or market work.
The utility function of a household is assumed to take the form
U(c; lf ; lm; q) = 2 ln(c)  
l
1+ 1

f
1 + 1

   l
1+ 1

m
1 + 1

  (lf ; lm)q (1)
where  is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, >0 is taste parameter for labor, q is the
per period utility cost of joint work, c is consumption and li; i 2 ff;mg is labor supply.
When (lf ; lm) = 1 i.e. both wife and husband supply labor, the household incurs a fixed
utility cost q  0.
Households know their utility costs before making decisions. They draw their utility cost
at age 1 from a cumulative distribution function () and it is constant over the life.
4.4 Income
The income sources are labor earnings, capital income and retirement benefits. Agents par-
ticipate in a competitive labor market where w is the wage rate per efficiency unit of labor.
Households can save in the form of a risk-free asset and earn a rental rate r. Further, I assume
that individuals are born with no assets and they are not allowed to borrow.
When the female and male work lf and lm hours in the market, a t-year old household’s
income (t  tR) with a units of asset holdings is x(k; t)lfw+z(i; t)lmw+ra = I:Moreover,
income of a retired household is the sum of retirement benefit payments and interest income.
4.5 Social Security
The government operates a pay-as-you-go pension system similar to system in Turkey. It
taxes working individuals’ labor earnings at a fixed rate, , and uses all of them to pay for the
retirement benefits. Individuals cannot begin to receive retirement benefits unless they supply
labor for tR years. If an individual supply labor for tR years, she will get retired in the next
year for sure. Once an individual gets retired, she cannot get back to work and supply labor
for the rest of her life. The retirement benefit is fixed for an agent throughout the retirement.
A female worker’s social security tax payment is Ts(x(k; t)lfw) = x(k; t)lfw and a
male worker’s social security tax payment is Ts(z(i; t)lmw) = z(i; t)lmw where  is the
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social security tax rate. For a female agent who supplies labor for R years, the retirement
benefit is bf =
RP
t=1
'tx(k; t)lfw where x(k; t)lfw is the labor earning of female at period t,
't is the replacement rate of period t and it is similiar for males.7
Total benefit payment that the household receives is
bf + bm =
RX
t=1
'tx(k; t)lfw +
RX
t=1
'tz(i; t)lmw (2)
4.6 Taxation
In this economy, the tax procedure mimics the current tax structure in Turkey. The flat tax
rates are used for consumption at rate Tc and for capital income at rate Tk : However, there is
a progressive income tax that increases with respect to the income level.
Let I0;I1;:::; IM be the income bend points with corresponding tax rates T1;T2;:::;TM . An
agent with income I 2 (Im 1;Im) pays the amount T (I) = T1(I1   I0) + T2(I2   I1) + :::+
Tm(I   Im 1).
4.7 Production Technology
There is a single representative firm which hires capital and labor. K denotes the aggregate
capital and L denotes the aggregate labor. The production technology of the firm is given
by a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas function Y = KL1  where  2 (0; 1): The
aggregate capital stock depreciates at a constant rate  2 (0; 1):
4.8 Decision Problem
Worker households make labor supply, consumption, saving decisions, and retirees make
consumption and saving decisions. A t-year old household with t  tR decide on labor
supply of the male lm; labor supply of the female lf ; future asset holdings a0 and current
consumption c each period. The wife has a skill type k, and the husband has a skill type
i, they hold a units of asset and q is the utility cost of joint work for the household. Before
making any decisions, the household observes the retirement benefits of the husband and wife
(bf and bm) that they would receive this period if they retired last period.
7I ignore the fact that it is required to work for 20-25 years in order to receive social security benefit.
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The problem of the household is
Vt(k; i; q; a; bf ; bm) = max
c;a0;lf ;lm
U(c; lf ; lm; q) + Vt+1(k; i; q; a
0; b0f ; b
0
m) (3)
subject to
(1 + Tc)c+ a
0 = x(k; t)lfw + z(i; t)lmw + (1 + r)a  Ts(x(k; t)lfw)  (4)
Ts(z(i; t)lmw)  T (x(k; t)lfw)  T (z(i; t)lmw)  Tkra
b0f = bf + 'tx(k; t)lfw; b
0
m = bm + 'tz(i; t)lmw (5)
0  lm  1; 0  lf  1; c  0; a0  0:
The problem of a t-year old retired household is
Vt(k; i; q; a; bf ; bm) = max
c;a0
U(c; 0; 0; q) + Vt+1(k; i; q; a
0; bf ; bm) (6)
subject to
(1 + Tc)c+ a
0 = (1 + r)a  Tkra+D(bf ; bm) (7)
whereD(bf ; bm) is the benefit payment that the household receives. D(bf ; bm) is equal to
bf+bm if female participated in the labor force before the age tR and is equal to bm otherwise.
5 Calibration
In this section, I describe the calibration process of the benchmark economy and parameter
values that I used.
5.1 Demographics and Heterogeneity
The model economy is calibrated to Turkish economy for the year 2006. In the model, length
of a period is set to be 5 years. Age 1 corresponds to ages between 20 and 24 years. Agents
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retire after age 9 (tR=9) and live at most 16 periods (T=16).8 All agents die at the end of the
final period and agents do not face any mortality risk throughout their life.
I assume that a skill type is represented by education and there are 3 productivity types in
the model economy which correspond to 3 educational groups defined in Table 1. For each
educational group I set the values of x and z to their corresponding values in Table 4.
5.2 Preferences
The discount factor, , is determined endogenously to match the capital to output ratio, that
is estimated as 2.48 by Tuncay (2011). The choice of labor parameter, , targets the average
working hours in the Turkstat 2006 Household Labor Force Statistics. In particular, a worker
spends on average 45.59% of her/his time for labor in the model economy, while the same
number is 46.2% in the data.9
I choose Frisch elasticity of labor supply, , as 0.4 which is estimated by Domeij and
Floden (2006). Finally, I assume that utility cost parameter, q, is distributed according to
an exponential distribution function. As discussed in Kaygusuz (2011), I parametrize the
utility cost parameters, so that the labor force participation rates of women in the benchmark
economy, match the participation rates of women in the data that is shown in Table 6.
Table 6: Labor Force Participation of Women, 2006 (%)
Female
Male ps shs col
ps 4.82 11.05 20
shs 3.17 9.21 33.90
col 2.30 10.33 51.74
5.3 Production Technology
On the production side, there are two parameters to be determined. There seems to be an
absence of consensus for the estimate of capital share of output, .10 I set  as 0.30 that is
8Females can always choose not to work at, or before age tR:
9I consider people who are between 20 and 64. According to TURKSTAT 2006 Household Labor Force
Statistics, on average a person works about 51.76 hours in a week. I assume that 112 hours is the total amount
of time available for work per week.
10Cihan (2002) estimates capital share of output as 0.53, TURKSTAT estimates are 0.63, 0,53, 0.61, and
0.49 for years 1988, 1991, 1995, and 2001 respectively.
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estimated by Bahadir and Gumus (2011). Additionally, I choose the depreciation rate, , as
0.0436 which is calculated by Tuncay (2011).
5.4 Social Security
In the benchmark economy, the replacement rate is 'i = 0:02 for all ages up to retirement.11
The social security tax rate, , is set endogenously to balance the budget of the social
security system. Thus, every period the sum of deductions from workers’ labor income is
equal to the sum of the retirement benefits of retired individuals. Finally, the mandatory
retirement age, tR, is set equal to period 9 which corresponds to age range 60-64 in the data.
5.5 Taxation
I set consumption tax rate, Tc, to match endogenously the average value of the ratio of total
tax burden on consumption and services to output, that is found by Tuncay (2011) as 0.0498
for the period 1992-1995. Similarly, capital tax rate, Tk , is chosen to match the ratio of total
corporate tax to output, which is again as in Tuncay (2011), 0.0104 for the period 1992-1995.
For benchmark calculations, I construct income taxation according to the income tax
practices in Turkey, 2006. In 2006, first 7000 YTL of annual income is multiplied with 0.15.
Next part of annual income, which is between 7000 YTL and 18000 YTL is multiplied with
0.20. The part of annual income that is between 18000 YTL and 40000 YTL is multiplied
with 0.27. Finally, the part of annual income that exceeds 40000 YTL is multiplied with 0.35.
In the model, income bend points I0;I1;:::; IM are established as multiples of average
household labor income, , in order to mimic the income taxation bend points in Turkey
2006, as shown in Table 7.12
Table 7: Income Tax Rates
Taxable Income Tax Rate
0-0.37 15%
0.37-0.95 20%
0.95-2.11 27%
2.11 and above 35%
11This rate is used in Emekli Sandigi in 2006 Turkey.
12Average household labor income is determined endogenously in the model.
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6 Findings
6.1 Benchmark Economy
Table 8 shows the basic statistics for the benchmark economy. In the next section, these
results will be used for comparison with alternative policies. To balance the budget of the
social security system, social security tax needs to be 7.2%. Similarly, consumption tax and
capital tax are required to be 12.2% and 5.3% in order to match the values that are found by
Tuncay (2011) as 0.0498 and 0.0104.
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics for Benchmark Economy
K 1.857
Y 0.759
K/Y 2.447
L 0.517
r 7.7%
Discount rate 1.06
Capital tax rate 5.3%
Consumption tax rate 12.2%
Social Security tax rate 7.2%
The model is able to capture the pattern of participation rates by age and education. As
in the data, the participation rate increases with age and declines significantly after age 5
(corresponds to 40-44). As I discussed in Section 3, the early retirement scheme introduced
in early 1980s may have caused this decrease; thus, the model is successful in generating
this decline. Both in the model and data, the participation rate rises with education, and the
highest participation rate is achieved at the university level. Moreover, the model is able to
generate the hours per worker for the economy, for males, and for females that are observed in
the data. In the model, workers spend on average 51.06 hours in a week while its counterpart
in the data is 51.75. Hours of working males is 51.97 in the model, which is 52.52 in the data.
I consider two alternative economies. These alternative economies differ from the bench-
mark economy in the following ways. In the first economy, I assume that females have the
same productivity values with males, that is to say, there would be no gender wage gap and
females would have same hourly wages as males. In the second alternative economy, females
do not have same wages with males; however, first (ps) or second skill type of females (shs)
would have same wages as females, who are from third skill type (col), i.e. all types of fe-
males would be considered as they earn the same wages as females who have less than or
equal to college degree.
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Table 9: Simulation Results for Benchmark Economy
2006 Data Model
Aggregate FLFP (%) 9.01 8.08
Mean hours (male) 52.52 51.97
Mean hours (female) 47 39.88
FLFP by Age (%)
1 6.1 9.86
2 11.39 10.42
3 13.02 11.82
4 14.4 10.83
5 11.57 9.01
6 7.79 7.02
7 4.28 5.83
8 1.83 4.28
9 1.06 2.96
FLFP by Skill Type (%)
ps 4.22 4.33
shs 9.8 9.6
col 47.62 47.78
6.2 Alternative Economy I
In this alternative economy, I simulate the model by changing the productivity levels of fe-
males with males, i.e. I assume that females earn the same wages that males earn. Table
10 shows the descriptive statistics for the model under the first alternative policy. The social
security tax rate is required to be 6% to balance the budget of social security system. Also,
in order to balance the tax revenues of government, consumption tax and capital tax need to
be 11.8% and 5.1%. As Table 10 shows, this policy leads to decrease in capital, consump-
tion, and social security tax rates, which are 3.77%, 3.28%, 16.66% respectively, and 3.69%,
5.33%, and 3.09% increase in output, aggregate capital, and aggregate labor.
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Table 10: Descriptive Statistics for Alternative Economy I
K 1.956
Y 0.787
K/Y 2.483
L 0.533
r 7.7%
Discount rate 1.06
Capital tax rate 5.1%
Consumption tax rate 11.8%
Social Security tax rate 6%
Table 11 reports the differences between the benchmark economy and Alternative Econ-
omy I. These results suggest that if females have the same wages as males, aggregate female
labor force participation rate would have been 12.34%, increasing by 52.7%. In this alterna-
tive economy, average weekly working hours would be 51.08 for males, decreasing by 1.70%,
and 43.18 for females, increasing by 8.35% respectively according to the benchmark econ-
omy. Also, there is an increase in women’s weekly working hours in every age group, while
in every age the opposite situation occurs in men’s working hours. On average, a worker
spends 50.22 hours for work, while this number is 51.06 in the benchmark economy.
Furthermore, while the increase in female labor force participation is analyzed according
to age groups, it is shown in Table 11 that the biggest increases occur in older ages. Since in
older ages, most males continue to work and earn wages, females choose to work when they
get these wages. Also, in this economy the increase in participation rates for females with ps
degree and shs degree are 93.53% and 40.62% respectively. This is an important result since
less productive females respond most to the changes in wages and they begin to work more.
Finally, in this alternative economy, in every age while consumption almost does not change
according to benchmark economy although savings increase.
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Table 11: Alternative Economy I
Benchmark Alternative %4
Aggregate FLFP (%) 8.08 12.34 52.72
Mean hours (male) 51.97 51.08 -1.70
Mean hours (female) 39.88 43.18 8.35
FLFP by Age (%)
1 9.86 13.89 40.87
2 10.42 15.03 44.24
3 11.82 16.05 35.78
4 10.83 15.83 50.33
5 9.01 14.59 61.93
6 7.02 13.44 91.45
7 5.83 9.71 66.55
8 4.28 6.24 45.79
9 2.96 6.18 108.78
FLFP by Skill Type (%)
ps 4.33 8.38 93.53
shs 9.6 13.5 40.62
col 47.78 55.85 16.89
This alternative economy demonstrates that gender wage gap has a significant impact on
female labor force participation. Many females choose to work when they earn the same
wage with males since their opportunity cost of staying at home increases. Moreover, since
low-skilled females earn less than low-skilled males, their participation rates increase when
they earn the same wages with males. However, for high-skilled females this increase is
not as much as it is for low-skilled ones because the wage gap between high-skilled males
and females is not huge. Finally, since females who are out of labor force are largely less
productive, a larger fraction of them respond to this change and the aggregate female labor
force participation rate increases.
6.3 Alternative Economy II
In the second alternative economy, wages of low-skilled females changes with the wages of
high-skilled females and all other parameters are kept as they are in benchmark economy.
Descriptive statistics for this economy is shown in Table 12. Again I balance the budget
of social security system and government’s tax revenues, and in order to balance them social
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security, consumption, and capital tax rates need to be 11.5%, 9.2%, and 5.5%. All else being
equal with the new economy, this exercise increases the social security tax rate, capital tax
rate, output, and aggregate labor, but decreases consumption tax rate and aggregate capital
according to the benchmark economy by 59.72%, 3.77%, 17.79%, 27.95%, and 24.19%,
2.14% respectively.
Table 12: Descriptive Statistics for Alternative Economy II
K 1.817
Y 0.894
K/Y 2.029
L 0.661
r 7.7%
Discount rate 1.06
Capital tax rate 5.5%
Consumption tax rate 9.2%
Social Security tax rate 11.5%
Table 13 reports the differences between the benchmark economy and Alternative Econ-
omy 2. When there is no skill difference between females, female labor force participation
rate increases to 28.57%. The changes in wages have an important role in the change of
the working hours of women; the hours of female workers increases and becomes 45.55. In
contrast, working hours of male workers decrease by 14.54%. When this increase in work-
ing hours is analyzed in terms of age groups, it is seen that females’ working hours increase
in every age, and it is the opposite for male workers. Moreover, as Table 13 shows, the la-
bor supply response of low-skilled females is stronger. Lastly, in this alternative economy,
while consumption increases according to benchmark economy in every age group, savings
decrease.
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Table 13: Alternative Economy II
Benchmark Alternative %4
Aggregate FLFP (%) 8.08 28.57 253.5
Mean hours (male) 51.97 44.41 -14.54
Mean hours (female) 39.88 45.55 14.22
FLFP by Age (%)
1 9.86 28.74 191.4
2 10.42 32.07 207.7
3 11.82 35.26 198.3
4 10.83 39.74 266.9
5 9.01 36.50 305.1
6 7.02 31.62 350.4
7 5.83 24.47 319.7
8 4.28 19.59 357.7
9 2.96 8.84 198.6
FLFP by Skill Type (%)
ps 4.33 26.84 519.8
shs 9.6 28.86 200
col 47.78 48.27 1.02
These findings suggest that female skill premium has a strong positive effect on female
labor force participation rate, and when it disappears more females are encouraged for labor
force participation. Also in this economy, the increase in female labor force participation rate
is bigger than the one in the first alternative economy, which means female skill premium has
more impact on women’s labor decisions than gender wage gap. Finally, again since there
are many low-skilled females who are out of labor force, a sizeable fraction of them respond
to this change, hence this significant increase in aggregate female labor force participation
rate occured.
7 Conclusion
This paper has been motivated by the low level of female labor force participation in Turkey,
concentrating on the effect of the gender wage gap and female skill premium on female
labor force participation rates. In this study, I built a general equilibrium model with two
member households in which households make work and saving decisions for its members.
I used this model to evaluate the difference in female labor participation rate in the absence
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of gender wage gap and female skill premium respectively. The simulations have shown that
when there is no gender wage gap, the participation rate of women increases by 52.72%.
Furthermore, the change in female skill premium accounted for 253% increase in female
labor force participation.
The findings have shown that in both alternative economies, more females are encouraged
for market participation–especially low-skilled ones–and their participation in the labor force
results in a significant increase in female labor force participation rate. Thus, the study shows
that female skill premium has a bigger effect on women’s participation decisions than gender
wage gap, i.e. as the level of education increases, women gain skills and the probability of
women entering labor market increases with the increase in the return of education.
Findings in this thesis are key for understanding the reasons of low participation rates
of low-skilled women in the labor market in Turkey. There is a large gap in earnings for
low-skilled women and men in Turkey, which may be reducing incentives for low-skilled
women to participate in the labor market. In the absence of affordable childcare, low-skilled
women face a high opportunity cost of working. Also, there is a lack of job opportunities for
low-skilled females in the urban sector compared to low-skilled males. Therefore, policies
that focus on amending the situation of low-skilled women in the Turkish labor market would
increase the female labor force participation rate in Turkey.
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